Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Allies. Afficher tous les articles
Affichage des articles dont le libellé est Allies. Afficher tous les articles

mardi 1 octobre 2013

D. Robert Worley: Allies or Protectorates

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After World War II, the U.S. deliberately built a system of protectorates. For curious reasons, voices from Congress, the administration, and the news media continue to refer to our allies rather than to our protectorates. Which best characterizes our system today -- a system of allies or a system of protectorates? Which would better serve U.S. interests and the interests of our friends?

U.S. presidents have gone back and forth emphasizing the role of ally or protector. The same mutual defense pacts can serve either purpose. The choice between a system of alliances and a system of protectorates has consequences, including the size of the Defense budget and the tempo of operations. A system of protectorates requires maintenance of a large military force and frequent military intervention -- a system of allies less so.

Prior to the U.S. entering WWII, FDR positioned the U.S. as the "Arsenal of Democracy," a provider of military supplies but not of warfighting forces. As it did in WWI, the U.S. entered the war late to tip the balance -- the balancer of last resort.After the war, the U.S. quickly established a system of protectorates to allow them to emphasize economic recovery rather than rearm. In perhaps the first postwar action as global cop, Truman took the U.S. into the Korean "police action" adding the costs of war and tripling the base Defense budget.Eisenhower ended the war, drew down the force, and expanded a system of regional alliances. Rather than military force, he used economic diplomacy against England, France, and Israel to resolve the Suez Crisis.Kennedy promised an anywhere, anytime, at any cost global defense, and expanded the military to make the promise credible.Nixon announced a return to Eisenhower's alliance approach, ended the Vietnam War, and drew down the force. Today's presidents, regardless of party, are under pressure to resolve regional conflicts around the globe. Anything short of immediate and decisive military response will be cited by hardliners as weakness, appeasement, and a failure to lead. A war-weary public introduces some caution, but the key factor is a president's strategic disposition.

One of the many ironies in recent politics is that the Obama administration appears to exercise restraint more like the old Republican Party from the Eisenhower-era while present-day Republicans John McCain and Lindsay Graham appear to argue from the direct military interventionism of the old Democratic Party from the Kennedy-Johnson era.

The idea behind a system of regional alliances is that regional actors have the most at stake, are best able to understand the problem, and best positioned to deal with it. The U.S. might provide advisors, trainers, and equipment, but regional actors would shoulder the primary burden and fight their own wars. Only when the outcome appeared counter to important U.S. interests would the U.S. intervene and then only with sufficient force to tip the scales. A regional political loss was preferable to direct intervention in never-ending conflicts where U.S. vital interests are not threatened. The U.S. would be the balancer of last resort. The "lead from behind" role played by the U.S. in Libya, among other responses, suggests that Obama has shifted toward Eisenhower's approach.

The idea behind extending a U.S. security guarantee to a system of protectorates is that secure protectorates won't enter into arms races to defend themselves that could raise tensions and inadvertently increase the likelihood of regional war. A system of protectorates not invested in their self-defense preserves the U.S. position as the last remaining superpower, and only that position makes the U.S. secure according to this line of reasoning. To defend its protectorates, the U.S. must maintain a preponderance of military power and must be willing to use it frequently even when vital interests are not at risk. Advocates of playing the role of global protector claim that the U.S. economy can support this approach.

In the realm of domestic policy, advocates of limited government often argue their positions on the basis of "moral hazard." That is, by creating social welfare programs for the poor, the state creates a dependency that undermines self-reliance and creates a permanent underclass of free riders. Extending the concept of moral hazard into the realm of international security, extending a U.S. security guarantee to a system of protectorates allows them a relatively free ride and little reason to invest in their own defense thus shifting the burden to the United States, its military, and its taxpayers.

Furthermore, granting unequivocal support may embolden the protectorate to pursue more aggressive policies than justified by its own power -- even in opposition to U.S. policy preferences -- thus increasing tensions and the need for a U.S. response. The tail wags the dog. Tension over West Bank settlement policies is one obvious example.

At the end of WWII, U.S. economic power was at its peak relative to the Eurasian states lying in rubble. It was deliberate U.S. policy for European and Far East economies to recover and grow. The U.S. economy has continued to grow in an absolute sense, second only to the European Union and with the prospect of being equaled by China in the coming decades. U.S. economic power may be at its peak in an absolute sense, but relative to the rest of the world, its economy peaked at the end of WWII and has been in relative decline since. Should the U.S. assume the same security posture given today's world economies as it did at the end of WWII?

Which security system should we rely on in the future -- a system of alliances or a system of protectorates? For reasons beyond my grasp, questions like this aren't asked of candidates for high office. If pressed, I'd wager that the wishy-washy response would be that the candidate preferred working through international bodies but would reserve the right to unilateral action. A reasonable position, of course, but it sidesteps the question. Where do you stand on the issue? Your friends? Your elected officials?

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dimanche 9 juin 2013

Majid Rafizadeh: Iran-Syria Alliance: Why the United States and Western Allies Should Not Intervene in Syria?

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Syria has been subject to a plentitude of political polemics, but just little scholarly research and analysis. Outlets have been saturated with writings by pundits and policy analysts who are beating the drum for the U.S. to intervene in Syria or pushing the U.S. to take a leadership role as it did in case of Libya. What is intriguing is that the same analysts are the ones who would later, should the U.S. decide to intervene in Syria, condemn the United States for its imperialists and modern colonial tendencies. Alongside the pundits, some politicians like Senator John McCain have also been publicly criticizing the current administration for not leading an active role for regime change in Syria and advocating for the implementation of military tactics such as buffer zones, no-fly-zones, and military deliveries. Yet, here are some arguments for why the United States should refrain from intervening in Syria.

First of all, it is important to address a widely argued sentiment claiming the positive impact that a Syrian intervention will have on the U.S.'s national interests and security. Such sentiment argues that if the United States intervenes either directly or indirectly in Syria and topples the Bath-ruling coalition's status quo, the Islamic Republic of Iran would consequently lose not only its consistent regional ally, but also its bedfellow in the international arena. As a result, this will disrupt Iran's logistical and communicational interactions with Hezbollah and Hamas, which in turn, would ratchet down Iran's regional influence. In addition, the next Syrian government, supposedly to be led by a Sunni-majority, would be more strategically allied with the United States and Arab gulf states (Saudi Arabia primarily) rather than with Iran. Therefore, regional pressure will increase and Iranian leaders will become more likely to appeal to negotiations for its nuclear enrichment program and human rights abuses, or alternatively, be subjected to the same fate as Assad.

Unfortunately, this argument does not stand against history or Iran's regional capabilities. Firstly, the Iranian leadership has a successful track record of emerging as the winner whenever a sovereign state in the Middle East experiences instability, civil war, or foreign intervention. For instance, the protracted civil war in Lebanon created the ripe environment for Iranian leaders to give birth to one of the strongest non-state actors in the region: Hezbollah.
Secondly, after the 2003 U.S. intervention in Iraq, Iranian leaders were able to immediately create a powerful Shiite proxy in Iraq - the Jesih AlMahdi (Mehsi Army) - as well as coordinate with Shiite leaders so as to infiltrate Iraqi governmental affairs. The Iranian leadership and Revolutionary Guard's tactical strategies are characterized not by public, foreign interventions, but clandestine investments in a local, community-based, organized group that empower a proxy capable of fighting not only regional governments but world powers such as the U.S. and her Western allies. When it comes to developing proxies, Iran can be considered as the regional mastermind. By implementing this strategy, Iranian leaders avoid being held legally accountable in the region and in the face of the international community.

If the U.S. were to intervene in Syria and liberate Damascus, Iran will definitely not be the loser. Iran has strong political bonds with the Alawite leaders and community and is capable of creating a proxy as powerful, if not more, than Hezbollah in Syria. The Alawite proxy can instigate considerable amount of tension through the region and can keep Syria destabilized and in a civil war climate indefinitely. The price of oil will inevitably raise as a consequence, which will also serve the interests of the Iranian leaders.

The second argument states that if the U.S. intervenes in Syria, the immediate "democratic" system of governance to follow will be strategically and politically allied with the United States. Those who make this presupposition should pay a closer examination to the socio-political fabric of the Syrian society, the state formation, and the process of democratization in the Middle East. In any case of intervention in Damascus, the immediate creation of a centralized government will be highly unlikely.

Democratization is not a simple process that is achievable overnight. I have several family members who have lost their lives in the battle against the police-state of Syria. Unfortunately, democratization is a messy and bloody process that necessitates sacrifices.

If the U.S. intervenes in Syria, we are more likely to witness one of the greatest regional and international proxy battlegrounds, of our generation, in Damascus since the Vietnam War which would pull Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraq and other powers actively into Damascus in order to preserve their national and geopolitical interests.

Part of this article was published in the Los Angeles Times.

Follow Majid Rafizadeh on Twitter: www.twitter.com/@majidrafizadeh

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